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Abstract The first construction of strongly secure quantum ramp secret sharing by
Zhang and Matsumoto had an undesirable feature that the dimension of quantum
shares must be larger than the number of shares. By using algebraic curves over finite
fields, we propose a new construction in which the number of shares can become
arbitrarily large for fixed dimension of shares.
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1 Introduction
Secret sharing (SS) scheme encodes a secret into multiple shares being distributed
to participants, so that only qualified sets of shares can reconstruct the secret per-
fectly [13]. The secret and shares are traditionally classical information [13], but now
quantum secret and quantum shares can also be used [3,4,11].
In perfect SS, if a set of shares is not qualified, that is, it cannot reconstruct the
secret perfectly, then the set has absolutely no information about the secret. It is well-
known that the share sizes in perfect SS must be larger than or equal to that of the
secret, both in classical and quantum cases. To overcome this inefficiency of storing
shares, the ramp classical SS was proposed [1,8,14], which reduces the share sizes
at the cost of allowing partial information leakage to non-qualified sets of shares. In
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ramp SS, a share set is said to be forbidden if it has no information about secret, while
it is said to be intermediate if it is neither qualified nor forbidden [5,14].
The first quantum ramp SS was proposed by Ogawa et al. [9], which made the
share size L times smaller than its secret, where L is the number of qudits in the se-
cret. In their study [9], there were two drawbacks. Firstly, it does not control how
information is leaked to a non-qualified set of shares, and there exists an undesirable
case in which an intermediate set of shares can understand a qudit in the secret, as
demonstrated in [15]. To exclude such a possibility, we introduced a notion of the
strong security of quantum ramp SS, which ensures no intermediate set can under-
stand a qudit in the secret (see [15] for its formal definition) and proposed an explicit
construction with the strong security.
The second drawback of [9] as well as our previous proposal [15] is that the
dimension of quantum shares must be larger than that of the number of participants.
When the number of participants is large, handling quantum shares become more
difficult, because handling large dimensional quantum systems are generally more
difficult than smaller ones. Our previous proposal [15] solved the first drawback but
did not the second. The purpose of this paper is to solve the first and the second
drawbacks of [9] simultaneously.
We will proceed as follows: Firstly, we modify the strong security definition given
in [15] in Section 2, because the previous definition in [15] required that all the qual-
ified sets are of the same size, and also that all the forbidden sets are of the same size.
Secondly, in Section 3, we carry over the classical strongly secure ramp SS [2,7] us-
ing algebraic curves to the quantum setting, then we prove that the proposed quantum
SS has the strong security. We also present sufficient conditions for its qualified, in-
termediate, and forbidden sets by using the technique in [6]. We conclude this paper
in Section 4.
2 Extended Definition of the Strong Security
Let q be a prime power, Gi (i = 1, . . . , L) and H j ( j = 1, . . . , n) be the q-dimensional
complex linear spaces, where Gi contains the i-th qudit of the quantum secret, while
H j contains the j-th quantum share. L is the number of qudits in secret and n is the
number of shares or participants. In this paper we consider the so-called pure state
scheme [3,4], in which a pure state secret is converted to pure state shares. Encoding
is an isometric complex linear map from
⊗L
i=1 Gi to
⊗n
j=1 H j. A subset J ⊂ {1,
. . . , n} is said to be qualified if the quantum secret is perfectly reconstructed from
the aggregated shares in
⊗
j∈J H j, forbidden if the aggregated shares in
⊗
j∈J H j
is always the same quantum state regardless of the quantum secret, and intermediate
otherwise, as defined in [9].
We introduce a new definition of the strong security, which does not require the
qualified and the forbidden sets being the same size. Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , L}, J ⊆ {1, . . . ,
n}, I = {1, . . . , L} \ I, and J = {1, . . . , n} \ J. Define GI =
⊗
i∈I Gi, and GI =
⊗
i∈I Gi.
The idea behind the following strong security with respect to I and J is that the share
set J has no idea on what is a quantum state ρI on the part GI of the quantum secret.
To formally express this idea, the quantum state σJ of shares on
⊗
j∈J H j is required
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to be independent of ρI . On the other hand, σJ also depends on the quantum state on
GI . When an illegitimate owner of the shares in J is guessing ρI , she or he is assumed
to have no prior knowledge on the part GI , which enables us to use the fully mixed
state as the state on GI .
By using the above ideas, we formally define our extended version of the strong
security.
Definition 1 We retain notations from the above discussion. A quantum ramp secret
sharing scheme is said to be strongly secure with respect to I and J if the quantum
state σJ on the share set J is always the same state regardless of the quantum state
ρI ⊗ ρI,mix of the whole quantum secret, where ρI,mix is the fully mixed state on GI .
In our previous paper [15], a (k, L, n) quantum ramp SS (in the sense of [9]) was said
to be strongly secure if all I and J with |I| + |J| ≤ k satisfy Definition 1, where k was
the minimum size of share sets which can perfectly reconstruct the secret, and L, n
had the same meaning as the present paper.
3 Explicit Construction of Strongly Secure Quantum Ramp SS
In the previous constructions [9,15] of quantum ramp SS, shares are generated by
using evaluations of a polynomial at pairwise distinct numbers in the finite field Fq
with q elements. Obviously q must be larger than n in those constructions. In the
above constructions, the dimension of quantum shares is also q, and larger values
of q usually make implementation difficult. The restriction q > n also exists in the
classical SS based on evaluations of a polynomial [8,10]. One of standard ways in
classical SS to overcome the restriction q > n is to use points on an algebraic curve
as done in [2]. We will propose an explicit strongly secure quantum ramp SS based
on the idea in [2].
It is well-known that an algebraic curve is mathematically equivalent to an alge-
braic function field of one variable [12]. So we will describe our proposal by using
terminology of algebraic function fields, as done in [2]. We briefly review the al-
gebraic function fields, see [12] for a formal exposition. The rational function field
Fq(x) over Fq is the set of f (x)/g(x), where f (x) and g(x) are polynomials in x with
their coefficients in Fq. Addition, subtraction, multiplication and division in Fq(x)
are defined in the standard way. An algebraic function field F is an extension field
of Fq(x) such that the dimension of F as an Fq(x)-linear space is finite. It is usually
denoted as F/Fq to indicate that it is defined by equations over Fq.
Example 1 Let F be the field obtained by adding y to F4(x), where y is a root of
the univariate polynomial y2 + y = x3 (x3 is regarded as a coefficient). Then F is
an algebraic function field of one variable, and denoted by F4(x, y). The process of
creating F4(x, y) from F4(x) is the same in spirit as creating the field of complex
numbers from that of real numbers by adding a root of z2 = −1.
Observe also that the equation y2 + y = x3 can also be seen as an algebraic curve.
There are eight points R1, . . . , R8 ∈ F24 satisfying y2 + y = x3. For example, (x, y) =
(0, 1) satisfies y2+y = x3 and can be R1. Those eight points can be used for evaluations
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in the SS proposed in [2] and also in our proposal described later. Note that usable
points for evaluation increase from 4 to 8.
In the following we will use so-called Fq-rational places. R1, . . . , R8 are examples
of F4-rational places in this function field. The solutions of the defining equation of
F, e.g. y2 + y = x3, are a subset of Fq-rational places, provided that the curve defined
by the equation is smooth. See [12] for formal definitions.
We return to the general description of our proposal. Let P1, . . . , Pn, Q1, . . . , QL
be pairwise distinct Fq-rational places of F/Fq. A divisor of F/Fq is a formal sum of
(not necessarily Fq-rational) places F/Fq, e.g. 2R1 − R3 in Example 1. The support
of a divisor G is the set of places whose coefficient in G is nonzero. For example, the
support of 2R1−R3 is the set {R1, R3}. Let G be a divisor whose support contains none
of P1, . . . , Pn, Q1, . . . , QL. For any divisor G, there is a finite-dimensional Fq-linear
space L(G), see [12] for a formal definition.
Example 2 Consider again F4(x, y)/F4 introduced in Example 1. Let Q be the com-
mon pole of x and y, in other words, the unique point at infinity belonging to the
projective algebraic curve defined by y2 + y = x3. Then a basis of L(uQ) as an F4-
linear space is
{xayb | 0 ≤ a, 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, 2a + 3b ≤ u}. (1)
Thus, an element h ∈ L(uQ) is a polynomial in which every term is a multiple of a
monomial in (1). We can obtain a value in F4 by substituting x, y in h by components
in Ri (for example R1 = (0, 1)) defined in Example 1. The obtained value is called the
evaluation of h at Ri and denoted by h(Ri).
In our proposal as well as [2], we also use another linear spaceL(G−Q1−· · ·−QL).
When G = uQ as above, we have
L(G − Q1 − · · · − QL) = {h ∈ L(G) | h(Qi) = 0, for i = 1, . . . , L}.
Now we are ready to describe our proposal. Since we assumed dimGi = dimH j =
q for all i, j, we can assume their orthonormal basis to be {|a〉 | a ∈ Fq}. Then the ba-
sis of
⊗L
i=1 Gi can be written as {|s〉 | s ∈ FLq }. To describe quantum ramp SS, it is
sufficient to specify the quantum state of shares corresponding to a quantum secret
|s〉 ∈⊗Li=1 Gi for every s ∈ FLq as done in [9,15]. We assume that
L = dimL(G) − dimL(G − Q1 − · · · − QL), (2)
0 = dimL(G − P1 − · · · − Pn). (3)
The secret |s〉 is encoded to
1√
qdimL(G−Q1−···−QL)
∑
h∈L(G)
(h(Q1),...,h(QL))=s
|h(P1)〉 ⊗ |h(P2)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |h(Pn)〉. (4)
The mapping h ∈ L(G) to (h(Q1), . . . , h(QL)) is Fq-linear and its kernel is L(G −
Q1 − · · · − QL) (see the end of Example 2). By (2) this mapping is surjective, and
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for any s ∈ FLq there exist qdimL(G−Q1−···−QL) elements h ∈ L(G) satisfying (h(Q1),. . . ,
h(QL)) = s, which justifies the normalization factor in (4).
On the other hand, (3) ensures that the mapping h ∈ L(G) to (h(P1), . . . , h(Pn))
is Fq-linear and injective. This guarantees that terms appearing in the summation of
(4) do not overlap for different s, s′ ∈ FLq , which means that the encoded shares (4)
for different s, s′ are orthogonal to each other. From these discussions we see that (4)
maps an orthonormal basis to a subset of an orthonormal basis, and that (4) defines a
complex linear isometric embedding, from
⊗L
i=1 Gi to
⊗n
j=1 H j.
Remark 1 One of the two classical ramp SS proposed by Chen et al. [2] is as follows:
For a classical secret (s1, . . . , sL) ∈ FLq , an element h ∈ L(G) with h(Qi) = si (i = 1,
. . . , L) is chosen uniformly randomly. Then the j-th share is computed as h(P j). Its
similarity to our proposal (4) should be obvious.
For its strong security, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The above quantum ramp SS is strongly secure with respect to I ⊂ {1,
. . . , L} and J ⊂ {1, . . . , n} if
|J| ≤ |I| + min{deg G − L − 2g(F) + 1, n − 1 − deg G}, (5)
where g(F) denotes the genus of the algebraic function field F/Fq, see [12] for its
definition.
Its proof is technically complicated and heavily uses the theory of algebraic function
field [12], so we move it to Appendix A.
For quantum ramp SS to be useful, a procedure for reconstructing the quantum
secret and sufficient conditions for qualified and forbidden sets are indispensable. On
the other hand, actually the above proposal is a special case of quantum ramp SS
constructed from algebraic curves studied in [6]. By straightforward application of
[6], {1, . . . , n} ⊃ J is qualified if
|J| ≥ max{1 + deg G, n − (deg G − L − 2g(F) + 1)}, (6)
and J is forbidden if
|J| ≤ min{deg G − L − 2g(F) + 1, n − 1 − deg G}. (7)
Note that (5) contains (7) as its special case |I| = 0. The reconstruction procedure in
[6] can also be used for the proposal in this paper.
The algebraic function field in Examples 1 and 2 has genus g(F) = 1. To make n
larger with fixed q, we must find an algebraic function fields with many Fq-rational
places. It is well-known [12] that the number of Fq-rational places is at most 1 +
q + g(F)⌊2√q⌋. F/F4 in Examples 1 and 2 reaches this upper bound, because the
place Q in Example 2 is also F4-rational and F/F4 in Examples 1 and 2 has nine
F4-rational places. Requiring more Fq-rational places generally makes g(F) larger,
which makes inequalities (5), (6) and (7) weaker. For fixed q and n, it is desirable to
use an algebraic function field with smaller g(F). Search for such ones has been an
active research area in pure mathematics for past 30 years, see [12]. In particular, it
is known that for fixed q we can construct an algebraic function field with arbitrarily
many Fq-rational places.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we argued that the previously proposed strongly secure quantum ramp
SS [15] becomes difficult in implementation when the number n of participants is
large, because the dimension q of each quantum share must be > n. To overcome
this drawback, we proposed new quantum ramp SS that allows arbitrarily large n for
fixed q while retaining the strong security. The proposed construction is similar to the
classical ramp SS proposed by Chen et al. [2].
Acknowledgements This research is partly supported by the National Institute of Information and Com-
munications Technology, Japan, and by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grant Nos. 23246071
and 26289116, and the Villum Foundation through their VELUX Visiting Professor Programme 2013–
2014.
A Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, we will prove a proposition covering a more general class of quantum ramp SS. We
consider a quantum ramp SS constructed from a pair of linear codes C2 ( C1 ⊆ Fnq with dim C1−dim C2 =
L, which was considered in [6].
Encoding is done as follows: We will encode a quantum secret to n qudits in
⊗n
j=1 H j by a complex
linear isometric embedding. To specify such an embedding, it is enough to specify the image of each basis
state |s〉 ∈⊗Li=1 Gi. Fix an Fq-linear isomorphism f : Fdim C1−dim C2q → C1/C2. We encode |s〉 to
1√|C2 |
∑
x∈ f (s)
|x〉 ∈
n⊗
j=1
H j . (8)
Recall that by definition of f , f (s) is a subset of C1, f (s) ∩ f (s1) = ∅ if s , s1, and f (s) contains |C2 |
vectors. From these properties we see that (8) defines a complex linear isometric embedding. The quantum
system H j is distributed to the j-th participant. For I ⊂ {1, . . . , L}, the map PI denotes the projection of
a vector to the index set I, that is, for s = (s1 , . . . , sL) ∈ FLq , PI(s) = (si)i∈I , which is a vector with |I|
components.
Proposition 1 Let f : FLq → C1/C2 be as above. Define
C′1 = {(x, PI(s)) | s ∈ FLq , x ∈ f (s)}, (9)
C′2 = {(x, PI(s)) | s ∈ FLq , PI(s) = 0, x ∈ f (s)}. (10)
Then the quantum ramp SS constructed from C1 ) C2 is strongly secure with respect to I and J if and only
if
dim PJ(C′1) − dim PJ(C′2) = 0, (11)
dim PJ∪{n+1,...,n+|I|}(C′1) − dim PJ∪{n+1,...,n+|I|}(C′2) = |I|. (12)
Proof By reordering indices we may assume I = {1, . . . , |I|}. For sI ∈ F|I |q define
f ′(sI ) = {(x, sI) | sI ∈ F
|I |
q , x ∈ f (sIsI )}.
We have dim C′1 = dim C1, dim C
′
2 = dim C2 + |I|, and f ′ is an Fq-linear isomorphism from F|I |q to C′1/C′2 .
In the definition of strong security, the quantum secret has the form

∑
sI∈F|I|q
α(sI )|sI〉


∑
sI∈F|I|q
α(sI )〈sI |
 ⊗
1
q|I |
∑
sI∈F
|I |
q
|sI 〉〈sI |,
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whose purification is ∑
sI∈F|I|q
α(sI )|sI〉 ⊗ 1√
q|I |
∑
sI∈F
|I |
q
|sI 〉|sI 〉R, (13)
where |sI 〉R is a state vector in the reference system for purification. The encoding procedure defined in
this appendix transforms (13) to
1√
q|I|
∑
sI∈F|I|q
α(sI ) 1√|C2 |
∑
sI∈F
|I|
q
∑
x∈ f (sI sI )
|x〉|sI 〉R
=
1√
|C′2 |
∑
sI∈F|I|q
α(sI )
∑
y∈ f ′(sI )
|y〉.
The joint quantum state of shares and the reference system for purification can be regarded as encoded
shares from the quantum secret ∑
sI∈F|I|q
α(sI )|sI 〉,
by using C′1/C
′
2 and f ′. Equations (11) and (12) is the necessary and sufficient condition [6] for J to be a
forbidden set, which shows the theorem. ⊓⊔
We start our proof of Theorem 1. Hereafter we make a different assumption I = {1, . . . , |I|}. C′1 and
C′2 in Proposition 1 become
C′1 = {( f (P1), . . . , f (Pn), f (Q1), . . . , f (Q|I|)) | f ∈ L(G)},
C′2 = {( f (P1), . . . , f (Pn), f (Q1), . . . , f (Q|I|)) | f ∈ L(G),∀i ∈ I, f (Qi) = 0}
= {( f (P1), . . . , f (Pn), f (Q1), . . . , f (Q|I|)) | f ∈ L(G −
∑
i∈I
Qi)}.
Equation (5) ensures that
|J| ≤ |I| + n − 1 − deg G
⇔ deg G ≤ |J| + |I| − 1. (14)
By [12], (14) implies that the mapping L(G) ∋ h 7→ (h(P j1 ), . . . , h(P j|J | ), h(Qi1 ), . . . , h(Qi|I| )) ∈ PJ(C′1) is
Fq-linear and bijective, where {i1, . . . , i|I |} = I and { j1, . . . , j|J |} = J. The above mapping also gives PJ (C′2)
as its image of L(G −∑i∈I Qi). Equation (2) implies
|I| = dimL(G) − dimL(G −
∑
i∈I
Qi),
which in turn implies (12) by the above bijection between L(G) and PJ (C′1).
On the other hand, (5) also ensures that
|J| ≤ |I| + deg G − L − 2g(F) + 1
⇔ |J| ≤ deg G − |I| − 2g(F) + 1
⇔ |J| ≤ deg(G −
∑
i∈I
Qi) − 2g(F) + 1. (15)
By [12], (15) implies that the mapping L(G −∑i∈I Qi) ∋ h 7→ (h(P j′1 ), . . . , h(P j′|J| )) ∈ F
|J|
q is Fq-linear and
surjective, where { j′1, . . . , j′|J|} = J. On the other hand, the image of the above mapping is PJ(C′2), which
means that PJ(C′2) = F|J|q = PJ(C′1), which in turn means that (11) holds. Since we have confirmed (11)
and (12), the proof of Theorem 1 is completed by using Proposition 1. ⊓⊔
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